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Abstract
We explicate a knowledge-activation framework depicting the link between lay personality knowledge and dispositional judg-
ments, building on work by Dweck, Chiu, and Hong (1995a, 1995b). According to this framework, most people possess knowledge
consistent with an entity theory (personality is Wxed) and incremental theory (personality is malleable), which operates according to
knowledge-activation principles. Consistent with this claim, we Wnd that people render more conWdent dispositional judgments when
their entity knowledge is made relatively more accessible through priming manipulations that activate aspects of their existing
knowledge. Findings also illustrate the usefulness of incorporating both speciWc and general knowledge in our analysis. The present
framework enhances and complements the individual-diVerences approach to the study of person theories prevalent in the literature.
 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 
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Lay dispositionism, the tendency to use personality
traits or other dispositions (e.g., intelligence) to explain
and predict social actions or outcomes (Ross & Nisbett,
1991), has been linked to many inferential phenomena.
For example, people tend to infer an underlying trait
based on a trait-consistent behavior, even if a situational
explanation of the behavior is warranted (Gilbert &
Malone, 1995; Jones, 1979). People also make overly
conWdent predictions about another person’s behavior in
 We acknowledge support by a SSHRC doctoral fellowship to Con-
nie Poon, and a SSHRC grant to Derek Koehler. This article is based
on Part II of Poon’s dissertation. Study 2 was presented at the Annual
Meeting of the American Psychological Society, Toronto, in June of
2001. Study 3 was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for
Personality and Social Psychology, Savanna, in February of 2002. We
thank Emily Marks, Jodi Cryderman, Natasha Chlebowsky, and Jamis
Goertz for their assistance with the studies.
* Corresponding author. Fax: +1 519 746 8631.
E-mail address: scpoon@watarts.uwaterloo.ca (C.S.K. Poon).0022-1031/$ - see front matter  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 
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insuYcient regard to uncertainties about the person’s
construal of the situation (Dunning, GriYn, Milojkovic,
& Ross, 1990). Furthermore, people overestimate the
consistency of trait-relevant behavior across situations
(Kunda & Nisbett, 1986).
A growing body of research on lay theories has
emerged in social, cultural, and developmental psychol-
ogy (for a review, see Morris, Ames, & Knowles, 2001),
attesting to the importance of commonsense knowledge
about the nature of the self and others in social thinking.
Dweck and colleagues propose that people’s tendency to
subscribe to lay dispositionism can be traced to their gen-
eral theories about the malleability of personality (person
theories) (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck, Chiu, &
Hong, 1995a; Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993). SpeciWcally,
an entity theory, the belief that personality consists of a
set of Wxed traits, orients the perceiver to use traits as a
unit of analysis and to believe that behaviors across situa-
tions are mediated by underlying traits. This belief fosters
a strong tendency to subscribe to inferential practices
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mental theory, the belief that personality consists of mal-
leable qualities, orients the perceiver towards
understanding situational-speciWc psychological factors
(e.g., emotional states and expectancies) that mediate
behaviors, rather than towards assessing traits. This belief
leads to a weaker proclivity for lay dispositionism.
Evidence based on inter-individual variations in person 
theories measured at a particular moment
This proposal regarding the relation between person
theories and lay dispositionism is supported by research
that largely takes an individual-diVerences approach
(Dweck et al., 1995a). Typically, researchers measure
participants’ person theories at a particular moment,
classifying those who hold an entity theory as entity the-
orists, and those who hold an incremental theory as
incremental theorists. Their tendency to subscribe to lay
dispositionism is often assessed concurrently (within the
same experimental session or questionnaire package) or
proximally (within a one- to two-week interval) with the
measurement of person theories. Relative to incremental
theorists, entity theorists more readily attribute traits to
a person based on trait-consistent behavior in a particu-
lar situation (Chiu et al., 1997; Heyman & Dweck, 1998).
Entity theorists also predict behaviors from a person’s
traits with greater conWdence (Chiu et al., 1997). More-
over, entity theorists are more certain that trait-relevant
behaviors will be consistent across situations (Chiu et al.,
1997), and that a person’s traits will be temporally stable
(Erdley & Dweck, 1993).
The complexity of the relation between lay personality
knowledge and dispositional judgments is not ade-
quately depicted by the “time-limited” individual-
diVerences approach predominant in the literature.
Particularly, this approach does not capture temporal
instability in person theories and its implications for dis-
positional judgments. The test-retest reliability of the
three-item Person Theory Measure, a measure of general
beliefs about the malleability of personality, drops from
.82 over a two-week interval (Dweck et al., 1995a) to
only .43 over an eight-week interval (Poon & Koehler,
2005). This level of temporal stability is arguably lower
than that of many other individual-diVerences variables
as measured by self-report (e.g., test–retest reliabilities
for scales tapping extraversion and anxiety are .80 and
.73 respectively over eight weeks; for a review, see Schu-
erger, Zarrella, & Hotz, 1989). Such instability limits the
long-term predictive validity of person theories mea-
sured on a one-shot basis. Poon and Koehler (2005)
showed, for example, that while people’s conWdence in
inferring an individual’s standing on a trait (e.g., “tidy”)
from their standing on a semantically related trait (e.g.,
“punctual”) was clearly associated with their person the-
ories as measured on the day the inferences were made,its association with person theories as measured a month
or two prior to the inference task was much weaker.
A knowledge-activation framework: Conceptual 
extensions
Although person theories are often measured as an
individual-diVerences variable on a one-shot basis,
Dweck and colleagues acknowledge the theoretical pos-
sibility that entity and incremental theories are knowl-
edge constructs that might co-exist within an individual.
Indeed, along with other researchers (e.g., Anderson,
1995; Kruglanski, 1995), they have suggested (but not
directly tested) that these theories can proWtably be con-
ceptualized within a knowledge-activation framework
(Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995b). Extending this conjec-
ture, we will contend speciWcally that a knowledge-acti-
vation framework can elucidate dynamic relations
involving lay personality knowledge and dispositional
judgments, including the instability in person theories
noted earlier. In this article, we develop such a knowl-
edge-activation conceptualization, and empirically
assess its usefulness.
Dweck and colleagues have focused on unitary,
abstract notions regarding the malleability of personal-
ity (e.g., agreement with the statement, “The kind of per-
son someone is, is something basic about them, and it
can’t be changed very much,” Dweck et al., 1995a, p.
269). In the present analysis, we consider also relatively
concrete or speciWc pieces of knowledge supporting these
abstract notions, such as factors shaping personality,
ideas about speciWc traits, and memory of particular
individuals (e.g., John becomes more courteous due to
his parents’ training). It is assumed that most people
have acquired from their socio-cultural environment
some knowledge consistent with an entity theory and
some consistent with an incremental theory. Within an
individual, available pieces of entity-theory-consistent
knowledge (including the abstract theory itself) form a
loose knowledge cluster (entity knowledge), as do pieces
of incremental-theory-consistent knowledge (incremen-
tal knowledge).
Entity and incremental knowledge may operate in a
manner similar to other constructs that have been widely
investigated using a knowledge-activation approach,
such as trait concepts (e.g., Higgins, Rholes, & Jones,
1977), stereotypes (e.g., Sinclair & Kunda, 1999), and
cultural theories (e.g., Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-
Martinez, 2000). Importantly, that individuals possess
certain knowledge does not entail that they constantly
apply it in their judgments. Existing personality knowl-
edge needs to be activated (brought to mind) to inXuence
judgments. Activation is assumed to spread within the
entity and incremental cluster. The accessibility of
knowledge (the ease with which existing knowledge is
retrieved) contributes to its activation (cf. Higgins, 1996).
C.S.K. Poon, D.J. Koehler / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 42 (2006) 177–191 179While the extent to which relatively activated knowledge
is ultimately applied in judgments may depend on other
factors, such as epistemic motivations (cf. Chiu, Morris,
Hong, & Menon, 2000; Ford & Kruglanski, 1995) and
the judged relevance of the knowledge (cf. Higgins,
1996), here we focus on accessibility as it is a cornerstone
of the knowledge-activation approach.
Like other knowledge constructs, the accessibility of
lay personality knowledge may be aVected by goals,
prior activation, and interconnectedness with other
existing knowledge (cf. Higgins, 1996). Situational fac-
tors may produce temporary variations in the relative
accessibility of entity versus incremental knowledge
within an individual. Chronic individual diVerences in
knowledge accessibility may result from diVerential
exposure to situations which engender relatively more
frequent application of entity or incremental knowledge
over a prolonged period (e.g., stable diVerences in family
environments) (cf. Dweck et al., 1995b; Higgins, 1996).
At any given time, the relative accessibility of entity ver-
sus incremental knowledge of an individual is a com-
bined outcome of: (1) its chronic accessibility and (2)
temporary accessibility due to relatively transient situa-
tional inXuences (cf. Higgins, 1996). Given that each of
the core theories (unitary, abstract belief about the mal-
leability of personality) is loosely linked to other pieces
of knowledge consistent with it, one’s theorist status
may serve as a general index (not necessarily the only
index) of the relative accessibility of one’s entity versus
incremental knowledge at the time of measurement. Will-
ingness to subscribe to an entity (incremental) theory
can be taken as an indication that entity (incremental)
knowledge is relatively more accessible at the time of
measurement and therefore potentially more inXuential
in inferential judgments.
In sum, based on factors known to aVect knowledge
activation and use, one can specify conditions under
which the relative inXuence of entity versus incremental
knowledge varies between and within individuals. Thus,
a knowledge-activation framework holds promise in
capturing complex, dynamic relations between lay per-
sonality knowledge and dispositional judgments.
Past Wndings can be readily interpreted within this
framework. In many studies where participants’ disposi-
tional judgments are assessed concurrently or proxi-
mally with one-shot measurement of their person
theories (e.g., Chiu et al., 1997; Gervey, Chiu, Hong, &
Dweck, 1999), theory eVects may reXect inter-individual
variations in the relative accessibility of entity versus
incremental knowledge at or near the time of judgment.
Our Wnding that person theories exhibit some temporal
instability may reXect within-person variation in knowl-
edge accessibility due to idiosyncratic, naturally-occur-
ring changes in everyday contexts (e.g., John’s entity
knowledge has become relatively more accessible since
he re-connected with a friend whose personality hasnever changed) (Poon & Koehler, 2005). This framework
can also accommodate chronic individual diVerences in
knowledge accessibility. However, given that temporal
instability may render one-shot measurement of person
theories inadequate for depicting stable individual diVer-
ences, our approach suggests that multiple measure-
ments of the same individuals, averaged over an
extended period, may be needed to yield better estimates
of chronic accessibility.
Current research: Empirical extensions
The current research empirically evaluates two
aspects of the knowledge-activation framework. The Wrst
concerns the additional insights that can be obtained by
incorporating relatively speciWc personality knowledge
in this framework. One advantage, we suggest, pertains
to the usefulness of trait-speciWc analysis. In other lines
of research, the value of such analysis is evident. For
example, Gidron, Koehler, and Tversky (1993) show
that people perceive diVerences among trait terms in the
minimum frequency of trait-consistent behaviors inher-
ent in their meanings (e.g., friendly implies a higher mini-
mum frequency of trait-consistent behaviors than
creative). Hence, for diVerent traits, people require diVer-
ent number of trait-relevant behaviors for attribution,
and expect diVerent levels of cross-situational consis-
tency in trait-relevant behaviors (see also Rothbart &
Park, 1986). As another example, Ross (1989) proposes
that people perceive some traits to be more stable than
the others, and that a theory of stability (change) induces
a tendency to exaggerate consistency (change) between
one’s past and present standing on various traits. While
Dweck et al. (1995a) show that a person may hold diVer-
ent malleability theories across broad domains (e.g.,
morality, intelligence, and the world), trait-speciWc diVer-
ences have not been explored. The current research
extends Dweck and colleagues’ work by exploring the
possibility that a person may perceive diVerences in mal-
leability among traits (e.g., seeing polite as more mallea-
ble than aggressive). Such diVerences may reXect
culturally shared understanding or be speciWc to an indi-
vidual (cf. Ross, 1989). In Study 1, we investigate the role
of such trait-speciWc knowledge in dispositional judg-
ments.
The second, more fundamental issue we explore con-
cerns the premise that entity and incremental knowledge
clusters are possessed by most people, subject to princi-
ples governing the operations of other knowledge con-
structs (e.g., stereotypes and cultural theories), as
described earlier. To date, there is no direct empirical
evidence for this supposition. The main focus of this
research is to empirically assess the viability of a knowl-
edge-activation approach to the study of person theo-
ries. As a litmus test, the relative accessibility of
participants’ entity versus incremental knowledge was
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and 3). The present framework predicts that participants
should make more (less) extreme dispositional judg-
ments when their entity (incremental) knowledge is
made relatively more accessible.
Clear demonstration of knowledge accessibility
eVects requires procedures that utilize participants’ exist-
ing knowledge. In Study 2, participants were asked to
explain why the personality of a Wctitious character, pre-
sented in a biography, remained unchanged (entity-
prime condition) or changed a lot throughout his life
(incremental-prime condition). As people tend to select
and use pieces of existing knowledge that Wt well with
the hypothesis to be explained (cf. Koehler, 1991), entity
(incremental) knowledge is assumed to be made rela-
tively more accessible, temporarily, in the former (latter)
condition. Similarly, in Study 3, participants were asked
to evaluate the meaning of proverbs consistent with the
notion that personality is Wxed (entity-prime condition)
or with the notion that personality is malleable (incre-
mental-prime condition), on the assumption that inter-
pretation of these proverbs requires use of the existing
folkloristic or experiential knowledge being targeted.
These priming manipulations diVer in an important
way from a previously-used theory manipulation in
which participants were presented with a fabricated sci-
entiWc article containing persuasive arguments and
empirical evidence for either an entity or incremental
theory (e.g., Chiu et al., 1997; Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck,
1998). Use of the scientiWc article served well for the
researchers’ purpose of establishing causal eVects of per-
son theories on judgments. Yet, it is unsuitable (and was
not intended) for the present purpose of capitalizing on
the existing clusters of entity and incremental knowledge
and assessing the impact of their relative accessibility on
judgments. The eVect of the scientiWc article might, as
our framework would predict, result from momentary
changes in the accessibility of existing knowledge, but it
is also likely to impart participants with new and sup-
posedly conclusive knowledge on whether personality is
Wxed or malleable, potentially producing enduringchanges to their person theories. In contrast, our priming
procedures were designed to temporarily aVect the rela-
tive accessibility of existing entity versus incremental
knowledge, without providing participants with new,
deWnitive knowledge that might create lasting changes in
their beliefs about the malleability of personality.
Study 1
This study investigates the relation between disposi-
tional judgments and naturally-occurring beliefs about
the malleability of personality at the time of judgments,
with particular attention to the predictive utility of trait-
speciWc beliefs. Generally, we expect stronger entity
beliefs to be associated with more conWdent disposi-
tional inferences, whether we consider between-person
variations in malleability beliefs, or within-person varia-
tions in perceived malleability among speciWc traits.
Method
Introductory psychology students (n D 97) Wrst com-
pleted a questionnaire on dispositional inferences. Each
participant made four types of dispositional inferences:
(1) predicting trait-relevant behaviors from traits, (2)
inferring traits from trait-relevant behaviors, (3) predict-
ing cross-situational consistency of trait-relevant behav-
iors, and (4) predicting temporal stability of traits. Each
item followed a format used in Kunda and Nisbett’s
(1986) research on co-variation judgments, and involved
an inference regarding a single trait. Table 1 illustrates
four inference tasks involving the trait aVectionate. Par-
ticipants made judgments on a probability scale running
from 0 to 100%. The midpoint of this scale (50%) indi-
cates the belief that inferences cannot be made with any
conWdence based on the information provided. Increas-
ing values beyond the midpoint reXect increasing conW-
dence in dispositional inference. Each participant made
inferences regarding 30 commonly-used personality
traits, such as warm, polite, optimistic, and assertive, forTable 1
An example item for each type of dispositional inference (Study 1)
Inference type Example
Predicting trait-relevant behaviors from traits Person A is more strongly characterized by the trait aVectionate than Person B.
What is the probability that you would Wnd Person A to behave in a more aVectionate way 
than Person B in a particular situation?
Inferring traits from trait-relevant behaviors Person A behaved in a more aVectionate way than Person B in a particular situation.
What is the probability that Person A is more strongly characterized by the trait aVectionate
than Person B?
Predicting cross-situational consistency of 
trait-relevant behaviors
Person A behaved in a more aVectionate way than Person B in a particular situation.
What is the probability that in a completely diVerent situation, you would Wnd Person A to 
behave in a more aVectionate way than Person B?
Predicting temporal stability of traits Presently, Person A is more strongly characterized by the trait aVectionate than Person B.
What is the probability that Person A will be more strongly characterized by the trait 
aVectionate than Person B Wve years from now?
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Wrst column.) The order in which the four inference types
appeared in the questionnaire was counterbalanced
between participants in a Latin square design.
Next, participants completed a 30-item scale on their
beliefs about the malleability of a set of speciWc traits.
Each item concerns one of the 30 traits used in the infer-
ence task, and is worded similarly to the Person Theory
Measure developed by Dweck et al. (1995a) (see below).
For example, for the trait aVectionate, participants indi-
cated on a 6-point scale (1 D strongly agree; 6 D strongly
disagree) the extent to which they agreed with this state-
ment: “How aVectionate a person is, is something Wxed,
and cannot be changed very much.” Each participant’s
ratings on the 30 items were averaged to yield an omni-
bus trait malleability score (Cronbach’s D .93). Lower
scores reXect a stronger belief that this set of speciWc
traits are Wxed. Taken individually, a response to a spe-
ciWc item (individual trait malleability score) reXects one’s
belief about the malleability of a speciWc trait.
Participants also completed Dweck et al.’s (1995a)
Person Theory Measure. This measure comprises three
items: (1) “The kind of person someone is, is something
basic about them, and it can’t be changed very much”;
(2) “People can do things diVerently, but the important
parts of who they are can’t really be changed very
much”; (3) “Everyone is a certain kind of person and
there is not much that can be done to really change that”
(p. 269). Participants indicated the extent to which they
agreed with each item on a 6-point scale (1 D strongly
agree; 6 D strongly disagree). Ratings on the three items
were averaged to yield a person theory score (Cronbach’s
D .87), with a lower score reXecting a stronger general
belief that personality is Wxed (see Dweck et al., 1995a;
for details about the scale).
Results
Responses to diVerent measures of malleability beliefs
As one would expect some conceptual relation
between person theory (i.e., general beliefs about the
malleability of personality) and beliefs about the mallea-
bility of a set of speciWc traits as a whole, not surpris-
ingly, person theory scores and omnibus trait
malleability scores were moderately positively correlated
(r D .45, p < .01). The degree to which person theory
scores were associated with individual trait malleability
scores varied among speciWc traits. The average correla-
tion between person theory scores and individual trait
malleability scores was .26 across all 30 traits. Highest
correlations were obtained for the traits loyal, reliable,
aVectionate, ambitious, and active (.48, .42, .39, .37, and
.36, respectively), whereas lowest correlations were
obtained for the traits tidy, secretive, shy, organized, and
unconventional (.08, .10, .12, .14, and .17, respectively).
What underlies the variability in the degree to which thegeneral person theory resembles the individual trait the-
ories? Conceivably, some traits bear stronger conceptual
links with people’s general conception of personality
than others (e.g., people’s general conception of a person
may hinge more heavily on the trait aVectionate than the
trait tidy). From a knowledge-activation perspective,
activation is more likely to spread between a speciWc
trait construct and a general conception of personality
under conditions of high connectedness (cf. Higgins,
1989). For speciWc traits that are more strongly con-
nected to a general conception of personality, one might
therefore expect closer resemblance between general per-
son theory and individual trait theories.
Inter-individual variations in malleability beliefs at the 
time of judgment
Aggregating dispositional judgments  across traits. To
examine the relation between inter-individual varia-
tions in malleability beliefs and various kinds of dispo-
sitional judgments, we Wrst averaged each participant’s
probability judgments over all 30 items within each
inference type, thus yielding four judgment scores per
participant. These judgment scores served as the depen-
dent variable in two separate regression analyses, with
malleability beliefs, inference type, and their interac-
tion as predictors. Participants’ malleability beliefs
were indexed by their omnibus trait malleability scores
in one analysis, and by their person theories scores in
another (see Table 2).
Before we present our results, some technical details
are in order. Note that malleability beliefs was a con-
tinuous between-subject variable here, and inference
type was a categorical within-subject variable. If we
use mixed ANOVA to analyze such data, it is
necessary to convert malleability beliefs into a
categorical variable, and some information may be
Table 2
Summary of regression analyses for variables predicting dispositional
judgments (Study 1)
Note. Judgments were collapsed over 30 traits. Variables were hierar-
chically entered in the order listed. Values enclosed in parentheses rep-
resent mean square errors. S D subjects within groups. See Pedhazur
(1982, Chapter 14) for technical details of how data obtained in mixed
designs can be analyzed using multiple regression analyses.
¤¤ p < .01.
¤¤¤ p < .001.
Source df F
Omnibus trait
malleability
Person theory
Between subjects
Malleability beliefs 1 11.19¤¤ 0.93
S 95 (333.47) (369.11)
Within subjects
Inference type 3 37.23¤¤¤ 36.82¤¤¤
Inference type £
malleability beliefs
3 1.85 0.77
Inference type £ S 285 (53.27) (53.89)
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beliefs as a continuous variable, we chose to use multi-
ple regression analyses instead of ANOVA. In our
multiple regression analyses, we used the technique of
criterion scaling to identify and control for variance
due to individual diVerences (as in a mixed ANOVA).
BrieXy, a subject vector consisting of the unstandard-
ized predicted score or mean on the criterion (i.e., the
dependent or predicted variable) for each subject was
created in the computation process. Creation of this
vector allows for separation of variance due to indi-
vidual diVerences from unexplained error, and hence
more precise and sensitive tests (see Pedhazur, 1982,
Chapter 14, for details of how criterion scaling can be
applied in multiple regressions to analyze mixed
designs). Results of our analyses are summarized in
Table 2, in a format typically used for presenting
mixed-ANOVA results.
When the malleability beliefs were indexed by omni-
bus trait malleability scores, we found a signiWcant rela-
tion between malleability beliefs and judgments (see
Table 2, top panel). To elucidate this relation, Fig. 1 (top
panel) depicts the slope of a simple regression of partici-
Fig. 1. Probability judgments as a function of omnibus trait malleabil-
ity scores (top panel) and person theory scores (bottom panel) in
Study 1.pants’ composite judgment scores (computed by averag-
ing each participant’s judgments across all traits and
inference tasks) on their omnibus trait malleability
scores. As predicted, participants with lower omnibus
trait malleability scores, namely those who expressed a
stronger belief that this set of speciWc traits are Wxed,
made more conWdent dispositional inferences than those
with higher omnibus trait malleability scores. A relation
in a similar direction, though less pronounced (see Fig. 1,
bottom panel) and non-signiWcant (see Table 2, top
panel), was observed between person theory scores and
dispositional judgments.
Malleability beliefs appear to have a similar eVect on
the four types of dispositional inferences. Inference type
did not interact reliably with malleability beliefs to inXu-
ence judgments (see Table 2, bottom panel).1 Belief-
related eVects aside, we obtained a signiWcant main eVect
of inference type (see Table 2, bottom panel). Generally,
stronger dispositional inferences were made from a per-
son’s traits (M D 74.3% when predicting trait-relevant
behaviors from traits; M D 68.9% when predicting tem-
poral stability of traits) than from trait-relevant behav-
iors (M D 63.7% when predicting cross-situational
consistency of trait-relevant behaviors; M D 66.0% when
inferring traits from trait-relevant behaviors). As trait
characterization of a person usually implies more than
just one instance of trait-relevant behavior, it is perhaps
not surprising that a person’s trait characterization
aVords stronger dispositional inferences than a trait-rele-
vant behavior.
Trait-by-trait dispositional judgments. The relation between
inter-individual variations in malleability beliefs and
dispositional judgments at the aggregate level also
holds at the level of individual traits. Table 3 shows
how scores on various measures of malleability beliefs
were related to dispositional judgments of individual
traits. Generally, participants with lower omnibus trait
malleability scores, or those who expressed a stronger
belief that this set of speciWc traits are Wxed, made
signiWcantly more conWdent dispositional inferences
for most traits. Relations of comparable strength and
form were observed when individual trait malleability
scores were taken to reXect beliefs speciWc to the target
trait in each inference item. When person theory scores
were used, a relation in the same direction, albeit less
1 In this research, all behaviors in the inference task were evidently
trait (or disposition)-relevant, as they were categorized in trait terms
(see Table 1). However, if behaviors are not clearly trait-relevant, a
Malleability Beliefs £ Inference type interaction might emerge. Gener-
al and trait-speciWc malleability beliefs might have a more pronounced
eVect on inferences based on traits than on inferences based on con-
crete behaviors that are not clearly trait-relevant. This possibility
awaits further research.
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traits.
Intra-individual variations in malleability beliefs across 
traits
Each participant tended to perceive some diVerences
in malleability among traits, as evidenced by within-per-
son variations in individual trait malleability scores. We
now examine the relation of such variations to a
person’s dispositional judgments across speciWc traits.
We conducted a hierarchical regression analysis in which
dispositional judgments for a given trait (averaged
across inference types) were Wrst regressed on the subject
variable, created using criterion scaling to represent
variance due to individual diVerences. The subject vector
consisted of the unstandardized predicted score or mean
on the criterion (i.e., the dependent or predicted variable)
for each subject (see Pedhazur, 1982, Chapter 14, for
details of how criterion scaling can be applied inmultiple regressions to analyze designs involving
repeated measures). This step controlled for inter-indi-
vidual variations in judgments. Next, the perceived mal-
leability of the trait was entered. To isolate within-
person variations in perceived malleability across traits,
the malleability variable in this analysis was formed by
calculating, for each participant, a mean of the individ-
ual trait knowledge scores across the 30 traits (i.e., omni-
bus trait malleability score) and then subtracting the
mean from each of its contributors. As predicted, less
conWdent judgments were made for traits perceived by
the individual to be relatively malleable than for those
perceived to be more Wxed, b D ¡2.29, t (2808)D ¡15.44,
p < .001.
Discussion
This study illustrates the incremental utility of
considering trait-speciWc beliefs, which are conceptuallyTable 3
Correlations and regression slopes between dispositional judgments for each trait and diVerent measures of malleability beliefs (Study 1)
Note. Correlation coeYcients (r) were between probability judgments (averaged over inference types) and scores on various measures of malleability
beliefs. Unstandardized regression coeYcients (b) depict change in judged probability per unit change along various measures of malleability beliefs
in regression slopes. Negative (downward) slopes indicate that lower scores on the belief measures were associated with higher probability judgments.
9 p < .10.
¤ p < .05.
¤¤ p < .01.
Trait in inference task Omnibus trait malleability scores Individual trait malleability scores Person theory scores
r b r b r b
Organized ¡.43¤¤ ¡7.0¤¤ ¡.09 ¡.9 ¡.10 ¡.9
Polite ¡.31¤¤ ¡5.7¤¤ ¡.21¤ ¡2.3¤ ¡.10 ¡1.1
Secretive ¡.30¤¤ ¡5.4¤¤ ¡.31¤¤ ¡3.5¤¤ ¡.09 ¡1.0
Shy ¡.29¤¤ ¡5.8¤¤ ¡.44¤¤ ¡4.9¤¤ ¡.13 ¡1.6
Athletic ¡.21¤ ¡4.3¤ ¡.46¤¤ ¡4.2¤¤ ¡.08 ¡.9
Assertive ¡.32¤¤ ¡5.2¤¤ ¡.39¤¤ ¡3.7¤¤ ¡.04 ¡.4
Unconventional ¡.12 ¡2.1 ¡.23¤ ¡2.7¤ ¡.02 ¡.2
Practical ¡.31¤¤ ¡4.9¤¤ ¡.24¤ ¡2.7¤ ¡.11 ¡1.0
Punctual ¡.30¤¤ ¡5.7¤¤ ¡.26¤¤ ¡2.3¤¤ .01 .1
Ambitious ¡.21¤ ¡3.6¤ ¡.27¤¤ ¡2.6¤¤ ¡.01 ¡.1
AVectionate ¡.21¤ ¡3.6¤ ¡.25¤ ¡2.4¤ ¡.14 ¡1.4
Loyal ¡.25¤ ¡4.3¤ ¡.27¤¤ ¡2.6¤¤ ¡.12 ¡1.3
Active ¡.22¤ ¡3.6¤ ¡.37¤¤ ¡3.0¤¤ ¡.02 ¡.3
Competitive ¡.33¤¤ ¡5.6¤¤ ¡.39¤¤ ¡3.7¤¤ ¡.15 ¡1.6
Procrastinating ¡.36¤¤ ¡6.5¤¤ ¡.32¤¤ ¡3.3¤¤ ¡.05 ¡.5
Sensitive ¡.22¤ ¡3.7¤ ¡.199 ¡2.09 ¡.14 ¡1.4
Independent ¡.21¤ ¡4.1¤ ¡.21¤ ¡2.3¤ ¡.12 ¡1.4
Idealistic ¡.24¤ ¡4.2¤ ¡.10 ¡1.1 ¡.04 ¡.4
Sympathetic ¡.199 ¡3.59 ¡.21¤ ¡2.5¤ ¡.13 ¡1.4
Conscientious ¡.23¤ ¡4.0¤ ¡.23¤ ¡2.7¤ ¡.09 ¡1.0
Anxious ¡.26¤¤ ¡5.2¤¤ ¡.53¤¤ ¡6.3¤¤ ¡.10 ¡1.2
Moody ¡.22¤ ¡4.0¤ ¡.50¤¤ ¡4.9¤¤ ¡.04 ¡.5
Likable ¡.24¤ ¡4.6¤ ¡.48¤¤ ¡5.1¤¤ ¡.14 ¡1.6
Warm ¡.28¤¤ ¡5.0¤¤ ¡.49¤¤ ¡5.0¤¤ ¡.06 ¡.7
Tidy ¡.29¤¤ ¡5.4¤¤ ¡.31¤¤ ¡3.1¤¤ .02 .2
Unpredictable ¡.189 ¡3.49 ¡.06 ¡.8 ¡.03 ¡.3
Reliable ¡.31¤¤ ¡5.6¤¤ ¡.24¤ ¡2.4¤ ¡.179 ¡1.99
Curious ¡.20¤ ¡3.6¤ ¡.37¤¤ ¡4.2¤¤ ¡.16 ¡1.8
Optimistic ¡.179 ¡2.99 ¡.15 ¡1.4  .01 .1
Tolerant ¡.16 ¡2.8 ¡.189 ¡1.89 .01  .1
Mean ¡.25 ¡4.5 ¡.29 ¡3.0 ¡.08 ¡.8
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malleability of personality.2 First, inter-individual
variations in trait-speciWc malleability beliefs predicted
dispositional judgments better than general beliefs as
measured by person theory scores. Second, within-person
variations in trait-speciWc malleability beliefs predicted
Wne-grained diVerences in a person’s dispositional judg-
ments among traits. Such within-person analysis is not
possible if we consider only general malleability beliefs.
In this study, participants’ malleability beliefs were
assessed on a one-shot basis, concurrent with their dis-
positional judgments. As malleability beliefs are some-
what unstable over time, such beliefs may not be very
predictive of dispositional judgments at another point in
time, especially over long intervals (Poon & Koehler,
2005). Temporal instability in malleability beliefs may be
conceptualized as within-person variations in the rela-
tive accessibility of existing entity versus incremental
knowledge. With a knowledge-activation conceptualiza-
tion, one can readily specify (and test) mechanisms
underlying such variations by drawing on factors known
to aVect knowledge accessibility.
Study 2
The relative accessibility of entity or incremental
knowledge may be increased by recent prior activation
(cf. Higgins, 1996). In Study 2, participants’ entity or
incremental knowledge was primed (or activated) before
they made dispositional judgments in an allegedly unre-
lated study. According to the present framework, entity
(incremental) knowledge would become relatively more
accessible in the entity-prime (incremental-prime) condi-
tion. Participants were predicted to make more conWdent
dispositional inferences after receiving an entity prime
than after receiving an incremental prime.
Method
Priming
Introductory psychology students (n D104) were
invited to participate in two allegedly unrelated studies.
The Wrst study, referred to as a study of reading compre-
hension and explanation, was used to introduce the prim-
ing manipulation. Participants were asked to read and
answer questions about three passages. The Wrst passage
was on gardening, and the second on cooking. They were
created to conceal our intention of using the third pas-
sage, a biography, as a prime. The two-page biography
2 It could be argued that the omnibus trait malleability scale predict-
ed participants’ inferences better partly due to shared method variance
between the two sets of measures. However, it is unlikely that shared
method variance could completely account for large diVerence in pre-
dictive utility between the two measures.detailed the achievements of a Wctitious Nobel Prize win-
ner named “Max Hermann,” the major milestones of his
life (e.g., born in Germany, attended university in Ger-
many, and later settled in the USA), along with descrip-
tions of his personality. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of the two priming conditions. In the
entity-prime condition, Hermann was portrayed as
unchanging throughout his life, being introverted and
analytical from childhood through adulthood to old age.
In the incremental-prime condition, temporal changes in
his Hermann’s personality were emphasized. He was Wrst
described as a rebellious youth, then as a single-minded,
introverted scientist during adulthood, and Wnally as an
outgoing, generous old man concerned with spiritual
issues. Participants were asked to use their own knowl-
edge to explain why Hermann’s personality did not
change (entity-prime condition) or changed a lot
throughout his life (incremental-prime condition). The
biographies did not directly provide the explanations, but
participants could refer to the material in the biographies
in generating their explanations. As participants were
asked to apply aspects of their existing knowledge consis-
tent with the hypothesis to be explained, we assumed that
the relative accessibility of the targeted cluster of knowl-
edge would be temporarily increased as a result.
Dispositional inferences and belief ratings
Next, participants proceeded to a social judgment
study. They completed the dispositional inference ques-
tionnaire used in Study 1. In addition, they expressed
their views on several dimensions of human nature (e.g.,
happy–unhappy, untrustworthy–trustworthy, rational–
irrational), including whether or not people’s personality
can change on a 1 (can always change) to 9 (cannot
change) scale. We included only this one-item general
belief measure (embedded among other “distracter”
items), instead of our 30-item omnibus trait malleability
measure, to prevent participants from consciously con-
necting the priming manipulation with the social judg-
ment portion of this experiment. Finally, participants
were asked to write down any ideas they had about the
purpose of the experimental session.
To maintain the cover story that the two studies were
unrelated, apart from separate study names, we used
separate consent forms and diVerent typefaces for the
explanation and social judgment questionnaires. None
of our participants reported suspicion that the biogra-
phy in the explanation task was intended to inXuence
their subsequent social judgments.
Results
Dispositional judgments
We averaged each participant’s probability judg-
ments for all 30 items within each inference type. The
resultant scores were submitted to a 2 (priming) £ 4
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factor varied within participants. Table 4 displays the
means of this analysis. As predicted, participants who
received the entity prime generally made more conWdent
dispositional judgments than did those who received an
incremental prime (Ms D 71.4% vs. 67.6%), F (1, 102) D
7.35, MSE D 212.47, p < .01.3 This Wnding is consistent
with the idea that clusters of entity and incremental
knowledge co-exist within an individual, and that
momentary variations in their relative accessibility aVect
one’s proclivity for lay dispositionism.
As in Study 1, participants made more conWdent dis-
positional judgments from a person’s traits (M D 76.3%
when predicting trait-relevant behaviors from traits;
M D 69.8% when predicting temporal stability of traits)
than from trait-relevant behaviors (M D 64.9% when
predicting cross-situational consistency of trait-relevant
behaviors; M D 67.1% when inferring traits from trait-
relevant behaviors), F (3,306) D 39.82, MSE D 63.89,
p < .001. Inference type did not interact with priming to
inXuence judgments, F (3, 306) D .35, MSE D 63.89, ns.
General belief ratings
As one would expect if each of the core person theo-
ries is loosely connected with other consistent pieces of
knowledge, participants expressed a stronger general
belief that personality cannot change after receiving an
entity prime than after receiving an incremental prime
[Ms D 4.23 vs. 3.33; 1 D can always change; 9 D cannot
change; F (1, 102) D 7.83, MSE D 2.71, p < .01].
3 Our main focus was on how the relative accessibility of entity ver-
sus incremental knowledge, as aVected by the priming manipulation,
inXuenced participants’ dispositional inferences. Thus, comparing
judgments between the entity- and incremental-prime conditions is
suYcient for testing our hypothesis. However, having a baseline condi-
tion could provide additional information about the locus of the ob-
served priming eVect. Study 1 could be used as a proxy baseline
condition, as there was no experimental manipulation and the disposi-
tional judgment questionnaire used was the same as Study 2. In doing
so, we found that the mean judgment of the entity-prime condition fell
at the 62nd percentile and the mean judgment of the incremental-prime
condition fell at the 44th percentile of all the judgments (averaged
across inference types per participant) in Study 1. This observation
suggests that our entity prime had a dispositionist-elevating eVect and
our incremental prime had a dispositionist-reducing eVect.
Table 4
Probability judgments as a function of priming and inference type
(Study 2)
Inference type Priming
Entity Incremental
Predicting trait-relevant behaviors from traits 77.2 75.4
Inferring traits from trait-relevant behaviors 69.6 64.6
Predicting cross-situational consistency of
trait-relevant behaviors
67.6 62.2
Predicting temporal stability of traits 71.5 68.1Within each priming condition, participants’ post-
priming general belief ratings did not signiWcantly corre-
late with their overall dispositional judgments (r D¡.07
in the entity-prime condition; r D .18 in the incremental-
prime condition). In light of this result, it is not surpris-
ing that the eVect of priming on dispositional judgments
remained signiWcant even when the general belief ratings
were included as a covariate, F (1,101) D 6.09, MSE D
214.03, p < .05. Thus, participants’ dispositional infer-
ences appeared to be inXuenced by both general and spe-
ciWc knowledge made relatively more accessible by the
priming task, in a manner that was not fully captured by
its impact on the general beliefs they expressed towards
the end of the experimental session.
Content of explanations
Coding scheme. Participants’ open-ended explanations
of why Hermann’s personality remained unchanged (or
changed a lot) allow us to identify the contents of lay
knowledge supporting an entity (or incremental) person-
ality theory. Their explanations were analyzed in terms
of the relative weight they accorded to three information
categories relevant for person perception: (1) trait infor-
mation, including personality traits and such context-
free dispositions as intelligence and morality; (2) process
information, speciWc psychological states that mediate
behavior or outcomes, such as context-speciWc goals,
construals, and moods; and (3) situational information,
contextual factors aVecting a person’s behavior. For
coding purposes, participants’ responses were segmented
into units corresponding to each clause. Irrelevant units
were then identiWed. Reiterations of the explanation
question, personal reactions to the biographies which
were unrelated to the explanation question, and units
that did not Wt into any of the three information catego-
ries were deemed irrelevant. Two raters were given tran-
scriptions of participants’ entire responses with units
demarcated and numbered (cf. Morris & Peng, 1994).
Relevant units were indicated on the coding sheets.
There were 439 relevant units across the two priming
conditions. The raters, who were blind to the experimen-
tal conditions associated with the responses, indepen-
dently coded each relevant unit as falling into one of the
three information categories. Examples of each category
of information appear in Table 5. The inter-rater reli-
ability of the coding was acceptable (Cohen’s D .70;
proportion of inter-rater agreement before Cohen’s cor-
rection for chance D .80).
DiVerences in social information use across priming
conditions. For each participant, the number of units
coded into each of the three information categories was
tallied from each rater’s rating, and then averaged across
the two raters. The averaged frequency counts were sub-
mitted to a 2 (priming)£ 3 (information category)
mixed-model ANOVA, with the second factor varied
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for each cell. This analysis yielded a signiWcant
Priming £ Information Category interaction, F (2,204) D
49.92, MSE D 2.30, p < .001. Relative to participants in
the entity-prime condition, those in the incremental-
prime condition focused less on traits [t (102) D¡7.38,
p < .001], and more on psychological processes [t (102) D
6.43, p < .001] and situations [t (102) D 3.70, p < .001] (see
Table 6).
Discussion
We hold that the main eVect of our priming proce-
dures on dispositional judgments was due to diVerential
activation of entity and incremental knowledge. An
alternative interpretation is that participants determined
that presentation of the biography was intended to inXu-
ence their dispositional judgments, and that they
adjusted their judgments accordingly to meet the experi-
menter’s expectations. We think this interpretation is
unlikely. The biography was included among several
Wller items as part of an allegedly unrelated reading
comprehension study. The “unrelated studies” design
has been used widely and with considerable success in
social cognition and other areas of research. Because the
content of the biography was manipulated between par-
ticipants, furthermore, it would be diYcult for a given
Table 5
Examples of trait, process, and situational information in participants’
explanations in each priming condition (Study 2)
Social information category
and priming condition
Example
Trait
Entity-prime “ƒ because he was shy”
Incremental-prime “Hermann changed from
being an introvert to an extrovert.”
Process
Entity-prime “Completing his research and 
Wnding the truth obviously made
Hermann happy”
Incremental-prime “ƒ because his goals changed”
Situation
Entity-prime “His parents never really socialized
him as a child.”
Incremental-prime “The environment around him
changed from time to time.”
Table 6
Use of diVerent categories of social information in each priming condi-
tion (Study 2)
Note. Numbers in table represent mean number of units coded into
each information category per participant.
Priming Social information category
Trait Process Situation
Entity 2.81 .36 .64
Incremental .69 2.19 1.75participant to determine which aspects of the biography
were supposed to inXuence their later judgments, which
focused at least as much on situational instability as
temporal instability in traits or trait-relevant behavior. If
anything, the judgment task would be expected to draw
participants’ attention to diVerences between inference
types or between traits; it is not apparent how the biog-
raphy would be seen as being relevant to either type of
diVerence. The account we oVer, in which the priming
manipulation aVected the relative activation of entity
and incremental knowledge that in turn inXuenced the
conWdence with which dispositional judgments were
made, would seem to be a more straightforward inter-
pretation of the results.
Our content analysis of participants’ explanations
suggests diVerences in the composition of social infor-
mation supporting two opposing views about personal-
ity. An entity theory seems to be supported mainly by
trait information, and to a lesser extent by process and
situational information, as shown in explanations of
why Hermann remained unchanged. By contrast, an
incremental theory appears to be supported primarily
by information about psychological states and situa-
tions, and only secondarily by trait information, as seen
in explanations of Hermann’s personality changes
throughout his life. Although knowledge used in partic-
ipants’ explanations in either priming condition might
only be a subset of knowledge activated by the priming
procedure, the content of their explanations might very
well reXect their information focus when they made
social predictions or inferences, given the conceptual
link between explanation and prediction. Participants in
the entity-prime condition might have focused on traits
when making inferences, whereas those in the incremen-
tal-prime condition on psychological states and situa-
tions. Such diVerences in inferential frame might
underlie the eVect of priming on dispositional
inferences.
Our content analysis empirically corroborates Chiu et
al.’s (1997) claim that it is the diVerential focus on traits
versus psychological states and situations by entity and
incremental theorists that gives rise to diVerences in their
tendency to subscribe to inferential practices associated
with lay dispositionism (see also Levy, Plaks, Hong,
Chiu, & Dweck, 2001). More importantly, this study sug-
gests that an individual may not always perceive the
social world using the same mental frame. Instead, one’s
inferential frame may shift when certain pieces of exist-
ing knowledge become more easily retrievable.
Study 3
To ascertain the generality of the Wndings in Study 2,
this study used a diVerent priming procedure to acti-
vate participants’ existing entity and incremental
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basis of our priming manipulation because interpreta-
tions of these pithy sayings rely on existing folkloristic
or experiential knowledge. Indeed, because of this
property, proverbs have been used by researchers to
prime other kinds of stored knowledge (e.g., Trope &
Gaunt, 2000). Any lingering doubts that the results of
the previous study are in some way attributable to par-
ticipants having discerned and complied with the
experimenter’s expectation that the priming manipula-
tion would inXuence their later dispositional judgments
should be resolved in Study 3’s use of the proverbs
task, which would seem to be an even more subtle
priming manipulation than the biography task used in
Study 2.
Method
Introductory psychology students (n D 111) were
invited to participate in two allegedly unrelated studies.
The Wrst study was referred to as a study of proverbs in
everyday life, in which the task was to answer questions
about three proverbs. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of the two priming conditions. In the
entity-prime condition, the proverbs were consistent
with the notion that personality is Wxed (“You cannot
teach an old dog new tricks”; “Old habits die hard”; “A
leopard cannot change its spots”). In the incremental-
prime condition, the proverbs were consistent with the
notion that personality is malleable (“It is never too
late to learn”; “Experience is the best teacher”; “When
in Rome, do as the Romans do”). For each proverb,
participants were asked to rate their familiarity with its
meaning on a 6-point scale (1 D not at all familiar;
6 D very familiar), explain its meaning, and describe
three situations to which it could be applied. They were
also asked to indicate the initials of the Wrst person
who came to mind when thinking about the proverb,
and to describe how that person exempliWes its
meaning.
The procedure following the priming manipulation
was identical to Study 2. We added two forced-choice
questions at the end of the dispositional inference ques-
tionnaire to check whether participants’ interpretations
of the endpoints (0 and 100%) and the midpoint (50%) of
the probability scale were consistent with our intended
meaning.
Two participants who were suspicious of the link
between the two parts of the experimental session were
excluded from data analysis. One participant who had
heard about our study and another who reported feeling
annoyed by it were also excluded. Four additional par-
ticipants were excluded because they misinterpreted our
intended meaning of a 50% rating on the dispositional
inference task, leaving 103 participants in the following
analyses.Results
Familiarity with proverbs
We averaged each participant’s familiarity ratings
for the three proverbs in his or her condition. The
resultant familiarity scores did not diVer across prim-
ing conditions, t (101) D .18, ns. The proverbs in both
conditions were rated as familiar (Ms D 4.51 vs. 4.47 for
the entity- and incremental-prime conditions respec-
tively; 1 D not at all familiar, 6 D very familiar). Indeed,
most participants were able to explain their meanings,
give examples of situations to which they can be
applied, and provide illustrations using their memories
of other people.
Dispositional judgments
We averaged each participant’s probability judg-
ments for all 30 items within each inference type. The
resultant scores were submitted to a 2 (priming)£ 4
(inference type) mixed-model ANOVA with the second
factor varied within participants. Table 7 displays the
means of this analysis. As in Study 2, participants who
received an entity prime generally made more conWdent
dispositional judgments than did those who received an
incremental prime (Ms D 70.0% vs. 66.1%), F (1,101)
D 6.24, MSE D 254.39, p < .05.4 The eVect of the priming
manipulation remained signiWcant after controlling for
the proverb familiarity ratings, F (1, 100) D 6.19,
MSE D 256.9, p < .05. This Wnding again is consistent
with the idea that clusters of entity and incremental
knowledge co-exist within an individual, and that varia-
tions in their relative accessibility inXuence one’s
propensity for lay dispositionism.
As in Studies 1 and 2, participants made stronger dis-
positional inferences from a person’s traits (M D 73.8%
when predicting trait-relevant behaviors from traits;
M D 68.5% when predicting temporal stability of traits)
than from trait-relevant behaviors (M D 65.5% when
predicting cross-situational consistency of trait-relevant
behaviors; M D 64.5% when inferring traits from trait-
relevant behaviors), F (3,303) D 44.49, MSE D 40.41,
p < .001. Inference type did not interact with the priming
4 Again, our focus was on how the relative accessibility of entity ver-
sus incremental knowledge, as aVected by priming, inXuenced partici-
pants’ dispositional inferences. Comparing judgments between the
entity- and incremental-prime conditions is adequate for our purpose.
Nonetheless, we could use Study 1 as a proxy baseline condition to ob-
tain additional information about the locus of the observed priming
eVect. In doing so, we found that the mean judgment of the entity-
prime condition fell at the 57th percentile and the mean judgment of
the incremental-prime condition fell at the 40th percentile of all the
judgments (averaged across inference types per participant) in Study 1.
This observation suggests that our entity prime had a dispositionist-el-
evating eVect and our incremental prime had a dispositionist-reducing
eVect.
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F (3, 303) D .01, MSE D 40.41, ns.
General belief ratings
As one would predict if each of the core person theo-
ries is loosely linked to other consistent pieces of knowl-
edge, participants expressed a stronger belief that
personality cannot change after receiving an entity prime
than after receiving an incremental prime [Ms D 4.49 vs.
3.48; 1 D can always change; 9 D cannot change;
F (1, 101) D 7.85, MSE D 3.34, p < .01].
As in Study 2, within each priming condition, partic-
ipants’ post-priming general belief ratings did not sig-
niWcantly correlate with their overall probability
judgments (r D .06 in the entity-prime condition; r D .20
in the incremental-prime condition). Given this result,
it is not surprising that the eVect of priming on proba-
bility judgments remained signiWcant even when the
general belief ratings were used as a covariate,
F (1, 100) D 4.27, MSE D 252.73, p < .05. Again, partici-
pants’ dispositional inferences seemed to be aVected by
both general and speciWc knowledge made relatively
more accessible by the priming task, the impact of
which was not entirely reXected in the general beliefs
they expressed towards the end of the experimental
session.
Discussion
The priming tasks in Studies 2 and 3 invoked the
use of diVerent aspects of lay knowledge. In Study 2,
participants could use their causal schemas when
explaining why Hermann’s personality remained
unchanged or changed a lot across his lifespan. In
Study 3, they could rely on semantic memory when
explaining the meaning of proverbs, and episodic
memory when illustrating their meanings through
their everyday experience. Seemingly disparate pieces
of knowledge possessed by an individual may be
organized in such a way that some cluster around the
notion that personality is Wxed and some around the
notion that personality is malleable, enabling the kind
of spreading activation that produced parallel results
across the two studies.
Table 7
Probability judgments as a function of priming and inference type
(Study 3)
Inference type Priming
Entity Incremental
Predicting trait-relevant behaviors from traits 75.8 71.8
Inferring traits from trait-relevant behaviors 66.3 62.6
Predicting cross-situational consistency of 
trait-relevant behaviors
67.5 63.5
Predicting temporal stability of traits 70.4 66.5General discussion
Motivated by our Wnding that temporal instability of
person theories can considerably attenuate their long-
term predictive validity (Poon & Koehler, 2005), we sug-
gest that the individual-diVerences approach prevalent in
the literature does not adequately capture dynamic rela-
tions between lay personality knowledge and disposi-
tional judgments. Following Dweck and colleagues’
suggestion that lay theories research may beneWt from
pursuing the implications of a knowledge-activation
framework (Dweck et al., 1995b), we have explicated the
content and processes of a knowledge-activation con-
ceptualization from which speciWc hypotheses regarding
inter- and intra-individual variations in knowledge states
and their implications for dispositional judgments can
be derived. The studies we have reported empirically
evaluate aspects of this conceptualization.
First, this work aYrms the incremental value of incor-
porating relatively speciWc pieces of knowledge (e.g.,
ideas about particular traits, factors aVecting personal-
ity, and memories of speciWc individuals) in theorizing
about laypeople’s social thinking. In Study 1, trait-spe-
ciWc malleability beliefs predicted inter-individual varia-
tions in dispositional judgments better than general
malleability beliefs. Trait-speciWc beliefs also predicted
intra-individual variations in dispositional judgments
among traits, which would remain unaccounted for had
we only measured participants’ general beliefs. In Stud-
ies 2 and 3, the eVect of the priming manipulations on
participants’ dispositional judgments remained signiW-
cant even when their post-priming general belief ratings
were controlled. Participants might have used both gen-
eral and speciWc knowledge made relatively more acces-
sible by the priming tasks when making dispositional
judgments, instead of relying exclusively on their general
beliefs.
Second, and more important, this research provides
evidence that most people possess both entity and incre-
mental knowledge, and that operation of such knowl-
edge may follow principles known to govern activation
and use of other kinds of social knowledge. In Studies 2
and 3, we demonstrate knowledge accessibility eVects on
dispositional judgments through fairly subtle priming
manipulations that utilized aspects of participants’ exist-
ing knowledge. SpeciWcally, when entity (incremental)
knowledge was made relatively more accessible by recent
priming, participants exhibited more (less) conWdent dis-
positional judgments.
From a knowledge-activation perspective, the Wnd-
ing that priming procedures in Studies 2 and 3
inXuenced participants’ post-priming expressed beliefs
about the malleability of personality can help account
for the naturally-occurring temporal instability in
person theories observed by Poon and Koehler (2005).
One can readily identify everyday experiences
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Examples include trying to making sense of the
changes (or lack thereof) in the personality of a friend
(cf. Study 2), and exposure to proverbs and other cul-
turally shared notions of human nature in conversa-
tions or other communicative contexts (cf. Study 3).
These everyday occurrences may produce idiosyncratic
variations in the accessibility of entity versus incremen-
tal knowledge, which manifest as temporal instability
in person theories.
We hope that our Wndings will instigate further
explorations of the wide-ranging empirical implica-
tions aVorded by a knowledge-activation conceptuali-
zation. While the relative accessibility of entity versus
incremental knowledge was manipulated through prior
activation in Studies 2 and 3, future research may
explore other determinants of accessibility, such as the
perceiver’s goal. It has been suggested that, relative to
incremental theorists, entity theorists tend to hold an
evaluative goal (i.e., goal of judging whether someone is
good or bad) when processing person information
(Dweck, 1996; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, & Sacks, 1997).
Whether activating an evaluative goal will increase the
relative accessibility of entity knowledge awaits investi-
gation. Another intriguing direction for future research
concerns factors that moderate the impact of accessible
personality knowledge. Previous research on other
kinds of social knowledge suggests that the use of rela-
tively accessible constructs tends to increase under high
need for closure (e.g., Ford & Kruglanski, 1995). Yet, if
accessible knowledge is judged to be irrelevant, its use
in social judgments may be inhibited (Higgins, 1996).
Whether similar principles apply to relatively accessi-
ble entity or incremental knowledge remains to be
tested.
Investigations along these lines will enrich lay
knowledge research, which has largely focused on the
implications of inter-individual variations in person
theories at a particular moment. As noted, within-per-
son variations in knowledge accessibility, as impli-
cated by temporal instability in person theories
reported by Poon and Koehler (2005), can be
accounted for. Furthermore, chronic individual
diVerences may be explained by examining stable
factors aVecting knowledge activation and use (e.g.,
prolonged contextual activation, chronically high
need for closure). In this article, we simply assume that
chronic and relatively temporary sources of accessibil-
ity combine additively. Yet, their precise relationship
remains to be tested. Future research may examine
whether individuals with a chronically large discrep-
ancy in the accessibility of entity versus incremental
knowledge and those with a chronically small discrep-
ancy respond diVerently to priming procedures
designed to increase activation of their chronically less
accessible knowledge cluster.Relation to the cultural cognition literature
Conceptually, the present framework is akin to the
dynamic constructivist approach to the study of cultural
cognition, which similarly uses knowledge-activation
principles to depict the inXuence of culturally-conferred
knowledge on social thinking (Hong et al., 2000). The
most signiWcant contribution of this approach is that it
can explain how the relative inXuence of diVerent cul-
tural theories varies within bi-cultural or multi-cultural
individuals (i.e., individuals who have internalized two
or more cultures) across situations and time. Paralleling
the priming studies in our research, Hong et al. showed
that bi-cultural individuals (e.g., Westernized Hong
Kong Chinese) switch between inferential frames as situ-
ational cues (e.g., cultural icons) aVect the relative acces-
sibility of their cultural theories.
Growing evidence suggests that East Asians are less
inclined to subscribe to inferential practices indicative of
lay dispositionism than are North Americans, at least
when situational information is salient (Choi & Nisbett,
1998; Morris & Peng, 1994; Norenzayan, Choi, & Nisb-
ett, 2002). Can a knowledge-activation framework
account for such cross-cultural diVerences? Su et al.
(1999) propose that diVerences between American and
Chinese social structures foster cultural diVerences in
theories about the social world and about individuals.
SpeciWcally, American society conforms more closely to
the Structure Accommodates Individual model, in which
individuals are expected to maintain their unique attri-
butes, as they are placed in positions that match their
needs and skills. In contrast, Chinese society conforms
more closely to the Individual Accommodates Structure
model, in which individuals are assigned to pre-speciWed
groups and to roles and are obliged to perform role-pre-
scribed duties. With such diVerences, it is suggested that,
compared to Chinese individuals, Americans more
strongly believe in the Wxedness of personal attributes
and the Xuidity of the social world. From a knowledge-
activation perspective, chronic cross-cultural diVerences
in the relative accessibility of entity versus incremental
knowledge about individuals and about the social world
may contribute to the aforementioned cultural diVer-
ences in lay dispositionist thinking.
Implications for other facets of social cognition and 
beyond
Laypeople’s knowledge about the malleability of per-
sonality has implications for a rich set of social-cognitive
phenomena associated with lay dispositionism, beyond
the four types of dispositional inferences examined in
this research. For example, past research suggests that,
compared to incremental theorists, entity theorists more
eagerly seek out and rely more heavily on potentially
trait-relevant information when making social decisions
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murder case) (Gervey et al., 1999). Also, entity theorists
make more extreme stereotypical trait judgments of
social groups than do incremental theorists (Levy et al.,
1998). The current work suggests the possibility that the
tendency to rely on trait information in making social
decisions and to assign stereotypical traits to social
groups may vary within an individual perceiver as well,
depending on factors inXuencing the relative accessibil-
ity of the perceiver’s entity versus incremental
knowledge.
The current research shows that when entity knowl-
edge is relatively more accessible, people exhibit greater
conWdence in inferences involving traits (or disposi-
tions). Yet, social inferences do not always involve traits.
For instance, people may predict a concrete behavior
based on situations and psychological states (e.g., Alex is
heading to a job interview. He is worried that he will be
late. Will he help a stranger who asks for directions?).
The present framework predicts that this kind of infer-
ence will be made with greater conWdence when incre-
mental knowledge is relatively more accessible. This
prediction remains to be tested.
The present framework of lay personality knowledge
has potentially rich links with other well-researched the-
oretical models and implications beyond social cogni-
tion. In particular, some researchers (e.g., Anderson,
1995; Graham, 1995; Sorrentino, 1995) have linked the
entity-incremental dimension of personality to dimen-
sions of causal attributions identiWed earlier by Weiner
(1985), including locus (whether a cause is internal or
external to a person), stability (whether a cause is con-
stant or varying over time), and controllability (whether
a cause is under volitional control). An entity theorist
who attributes a personal or social outcome (e.g., success
or failure to achieve a particular goal) to a Wxed trait
may be seen as attributing the outcome to an internal,
stable, and uncontrollable cause. DiVerent attribution
styles are associated with a wide array of emotional and
behavioral correlates (for a review, see Weiner, 1985;
Weiner & Graham, 1999), and so are diVerent person
theories (for a review, see Dweck & Leggett, 1988;
Dweck et al., 1995a). In Dweck et al.’s (1995b) view, per-
son theories give rise to diVerent attribution styles.
Future research based on a knowledge-activation per-
spective may systematically explore how diVerent attri-
bution styles are allied with the networks of entity and
incremental knowledge, and how relative activation of
particular knowledge networks impact one’s emotional
and behavioral responses to personal and social out-
comes (cf. Dweck et al., 1995b).
Clinical relevance
Clinical psychologists sometimes conduct personality
assessments using interview and questionnaire data, theinterpretations of which often involve trait inferences. A
patient judged to exhibit certain traits (e.g., conscien-
tious, controlling, orderly, and rigid) to an excessive
degree may receive a personality disorder diagnosis (e.g.,
obsessive–compulsive personality), which may be used
to understand his or her diYculties. Assessment of per-
sonality (disorders) is often criticized for its low reliabil-
ity (e.g., Perry, 1992). According to the present
framework, chronic diVerences in the relative accessibil-
ity of entity versus incremental knowledge among clini-
cians may explain some of the inter-rater variance.
Variations in knowledge accessibility within the same
clinician across time and situations may constitute
another source of unreliability.
On the intervention front, instilling in patients hope
that they can change (improve) is often seen as a core
task in psychotherapy. Indeed, evidence based on non-
patient samples suggests that incremental self-theorists
tend to show more constructive behavioral and emo-
tional responses to life challenges than do entity self-the-
orists (Beer, 2002; Dweck, 1999). Related to this evidence
is the demonstrated success of attribution re-training pro-
grams in increasing achievement motivation and enhanc-
ing academic performance of college students who
experience academic setbacks at the time of intervention.
These attribution re-training programs directly commu-
nicate to students that their academic setbacks are due to
unstable causes (see, e.g., Van Overwalle & De Metsena-
ere, 1990; Wilson & Linville, 1985). To the extent that
being an incremental theorist is beneWcial, it might be
worth exploring in future research the therapeutic value
of raising the relative accessibility of patients’ existing
incremental self-knowledge (i.e., knowledge supporting
the view that positive self-change is possible).
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